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Cal.2d 1 [187 P.2d 752]. It appears that the majority is
now relying upon the last mentioned case without even citing
the Hamasaki case. An analysis of the comparative reasoning in the Fuentes case and the case at bar with the Hamasaki
case makes it clear that the rule for which the majority stand
is that where evidence of liability might have the effect of
bringing about or increasing an award of damages it is not
admissible but if it has the effect of reducing or defeating an
award of damages it is admissible. This line of reasoning
is out of harmony with my concept of how the law should be
administered to achieve equal justice.
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-It is my view that the opinion
prepared for the District Court of Appeal by Presiding Justice Shinn, and concurred in by Justices Wood (Parker) and
Vallee (reported in (Cal.App.) 258 P.2d 861), adequately
discusses and correctly resolves all issues of law presented
by this appeal. For the reasons therein stated I would affir·m
the judgment.

[L. A. No. 22668.

In Bank.

Mar. 12, 1954.]

EDWARD K. ZUCKERMAN et al., Appellants, v. UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD'S, LONDON (an Association),
Respondent.
[1] Insurance-Instructions-Cause of Death.-In action on accident policies to recover for alleged accidental death of insured
on ground that death was due to exposure to elements and
physical exhaustion resulting from accident during fishing trip,
first two sentences of instruction that beneficiaries have burden
of proving that death was not directly or indirectly caused
or contributed to by intentional self-injury, disease or natural
causes, and that beneficiaries may not recover if evidence
affirmatively shows that such factors caused or contributed to
death, unduly stressed significance of any contribution to insured's death by preexisting disease or intentional self-injury,
but where last sentence of instruction told jurors that
they were to determine meaning of "caused or contributed to"
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3] Insurance, § 313; [2] Appeal and
Error, §1088; [4] Trial, §139(3); [5] Insurance, §269; [6, 7]
Insurance, § 185 (2) ; [8] Insurance, § 291; [9, 11, 13] Insurance,
§269; [10] Insurance, §185; [12] Insurance, §§257(2), 269;
[14, 15, 17] Insurance, § 332; [16] Appeal and Error, § 1166.
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and "directly or indirectly" from "all of the instructions and
as a whole," and other instruntions correctly stated e~nditions
of insurer's
it was assumed that J·urors
fol}ffl'ved
!
~
the law properly. ~//
[21
Allege Error-Estoppel.---A party cannot
complain on
of error in an instruction given at request
of his adversary when an instruction requested by him also
contains same error.
[3a, 3b] Insurance-Instructions-Cause of Death.-In action on
accident policies to recover for alleged accidental death of
insured on ground that death was due to exposure to elements
and physical exhaustion resulting from accident during fishing
trip, an instruction that proximate cause of death is that cause
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces death and without which
the result would not have occurred, and that jury should return
a verdict for insurer if they find that insured's death would
have occurred in any event at or about time it did occur, as
result of intentional self-injuTy, disease or natural causes
from which he was suffering t;ontinuously before and after
alleged accident, is proper, when read with other instructions,
since it merely conversely declares rule which requires beneficiaries to prove that an accident was prime or moving cause
of death.
[ 4] Trial-Instructions.-Instructions which are cumulative or
merely amplifications of other instructions need not be given.
[5] Insurance-Burden of Proof-Risk and Cause of Loss.-Ordinarily the burden is on insurer to prove a true excepted cause
or excluded risk in order to defeat liability on that ground.
[6] Id.-Risks and Causes of Loss-Risks Excepted-Intentional
Injury.-"Intentional self-injury," as used in an accident
policy, is the antonym of "accidental," and there.fore expresses
a concept which is antithesis of death occasioned by accident.
[7] !d.-Risks and Causes of Loss-Risks Excepted-Intentional
Injury.-Death by suicide reasonably may be said to have been
eaused by "intentional self-injury."
[8] Id.-Bvidence-Cause of Death.--In action on accident policy,
by proof of accident proximately causing death, beneficiary
necessarily negatives "intentional self-injury."
[9] !d.-Burden of Proof-Risk and Cause of Loss.--In action
on accident policy as distinguished from action on life insurance policy, burden of
suicidt> should not be
placed on insurer, as provision as to death from that cause is
not a condition
but is mPrcly definitive of precise
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 555; Am.Jur., Appeal
and Error, § 871 et seq.
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risk assumed. (Overruling Postle1· v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 173
Cal. 1, 158 P. 1022; Mah See v. North American Ace. Ins. Co.,
190 Cal. 421, 213 P. 42; and Housh v. Pacific States Life Ins.
Co., 2 Cal.App.2d 14, 37 P.2d 41, insofar as these decisions
are inconsistent with rule stated, on issue of burden of proof.)
[10] Id.-Risks and Causes of Loss-Risks Excepted-Disease.While a rule as to whether or not death caused by disease
constitutes a true excepted risk cannot be given in general
terms or by way of broad principles of law, ordinarily the
insurer, under an accident policy, is not liable for death by
mere disease even in absence of usual clause expressly excluding disease from among risks assumed.
[11] !d.-Instructions-Cause of Death.-In action on accident
policies to recover for alleged accidental death of insured on
ground that death was due to exposure to elements and physical
exhaustion resulting from accident during fishing trip, it was
not error to instruct on burden of proof in very general terms
without attempting to define disease, where insurer had not
urged that beneficiaries' theory was not within scope and intent of policies, and where beneficiaries did not assert that evidence offered by insurer, which tended to show that insured
was suffering from certain organic conditions, did not constitute "disease."
[12] !d.-Pleading-Answer: Burden of Proof-Cause of Death.A denial that death was occasioned by bodily injury within
meaning of accident policy is a sufficient plea, and additional
defense that it was result of intentional self-injury or disease
does not shift burden of proof to insurer.
[13] !d.-Instructions-Cause of Death.-In action on accident
policies to recover for alleged accidental death of insured on
ground that death was due to exposure to elements and physical
exhaustion resulting from accident during fishing trip, refusal to instruct on difference between "accidental death" and
"death by accidental means" is not error where policies do not
use either term and their provisions are before jury.
[14] !d.-Appeal- Harmless Error- Instructions.-Where term
"bodily injury" as used in accident policies was defined for
jurors by stating express language of policies, and they were
told that "Bodily injury which shall occasion death" includes
death by exposure to elements or physical exhaustion or
drowning from an accident or mechanical or other failure of
anything used as a means of transportation, no prejudice to
beneficiaries resulted from refusal to instruct as to other
meanings of insuring phrase.
[10] See Cal.Jur., Insurance, § 103; Am.Jur., Insurance, § 995
et seq.

Mar. 1954]

ZucKERMAN v. UNDERvYRlTERS AT LLOYD's

463

[42 C.2d 460; 267 P.2d 7771

[15a, 15b] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions.-In action
on accident policies in one of which insured's brother was
named beneficiary and in other of which insured's law partnership was named beneficiary, alleged error in submitting issue
of notice of death to insurer was not prejudicial to either insured's brother or law partnership, and there was no miscarriage of justice within meaning of Canst., art. VI, § 4¥2,
where brother did not know that he was a named beneficiary
until proximately time that notice was given on behalf of
partnership and brother, and where it was improbable that
jury could have found that he failed to comply with provision
relating to insurer's right to an autopsy.
[16] Appeal-Presumptions-Instructions.-On appeal it will be
assumed that jury understood the instructions and applied them
to evidence.
(17] Insurance-Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions.-In action on accident policies to recover for alleged accidental
death of insured, insured's brother was not prejudiced by
submission of insurer's autopsy rights to jury, where brother
did not order cremation and where he did not know that he
was a beneficiary under one of policies until at least one week
after cremation of insured's body; and insured's law partnership, which was named as beneficiary in other policy, was not
prejudiced by permitting such question to go to jury where
jury's implied finding was that insured's death did not result
from a "bodily injury" within meaning of policies.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Robert H. Scott, ,Judge,. Affirmed.
Action to recover on accident insurance policies.
ment for defendants affirmed.

Judg-

Francis J. Gabel and Henry F. Walker for Appellants.
Adams, Duque, Davis & Hazeltine and Waller Taylor II,
for Respondent.
EDMONDS, J.-Upon trial of the action brought by the
beneficiaries under two accident insurance policies upon the
life of George H. Francis, a jury returned verdicts in favor
of the insurer. As grounds for reversal of the judgment
denying recovery, it is contended that certain instructions to
the jury were prejudicially erroneous.
One of the policies sued upon insured the life of Francis
in the amount of $100,000 for the benefit of the law firm of
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which he was a member. A second policy for $75,000 provided that the insurance should be payable to the law firm
and to James H. Francis, his brother.
The answer of the insurer admitted that the policies were
in effect at the time of the death of Francis but denied liability thereunder. As separate and affirmative defenses, it
alleged that death was caused by (1) disease or natural
causes, and (2) intentional self-injury.
The evid.ence shows that Francis, a resident of Los Angeles, went to Mexico on a fishing trip. As the result of a
storm, the boat used by him and several others in the party
was unable to return to the mainland and the men spent a
cold and uncomfortable night on an island. The next day
Francis complained about not feeling well. He kept himself
wrapped in blankets and there is considerable evidence that
he appeared to have frequent chills. However, Stilbert, one
of the men who accompanied Francis, testified that at no time
did Francis appear to him to be ill.
The record includes the testimony that Francis did not go
to his office on the three days following his return to Los
Angeles. However, :B'red Paulsen testified that he and
Francis were together at the latter's ofiice on one of those
days for one or two hours. He said that Francis ''appeared
to be in good health, so far as I know.'' Other testimony
is that during those three days Francis was suffering from
a cold, evidenced by the symptoms of sneezing and coughing.
On the third day, Francis consulted a physician and asked
him to prescribe for a cold. Pursuant to the physician's
advice, Francis obtained aureomycin and sleeping tablets.
Francis then decided that his condition would improve if
he visited his brother who lived on the desert. On the following afternoon, Francis drove to Victorville and parked
his car in a picnic ground near by. Two days later, he
was discovered in the car, dead. The car was facing south
and all of the windows were closed. Francis was lying in the
back seat in a supine position ·with his head to the east on a
small pillow. His left arm was down off the seat and the
right arm was lying across his body. His collar was buttoned
and his tie intact, as were all of his clothes. As to his
general appearance, the deputy sheriff who investigated testified that "he was lying there in a peaceful manner." 'l'he
keys to the car were in 1<--,rancis' coat pocket.
An autopsy, not requested by any of the parties, was performed by county autopsy surgeon Baird on the following
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Monday. Two days later the body was cremated. The record
does not show at whose order this was done. Some seven to
12 days after the death of Francis, Norman Pittluck, an
attorney employed by the law firm, discovered the insurance
policies and informed Arthur E. Edmunds, one of the partners, of their terms.
Eleven days after the body of Francis was discovered,
Underwriters was notified of the death and claim filed for
payment. Underwriters, pursuant to the provisions of the
policies, requested permission to perform a post-mortem
examination. The insurer was informed on April 25th that
the body had been cremated.
The testimony as to the cause of death is conflicting and
extremely technical. The certificate of death, signed by
Dr. Baird, states:

"Disease or condition directly leading to death:
(A) Bronchopneumonia.
''Antecedent Causes. Morbid conditions, if any giving rise
to the above cause (A) stating the underlying cause last:
"Due to (B) Edema of Brain. Due to (C) Acute Alcoholism.''
Dr. Baird testified that he put "acute alcoholism" on the
death certificate because an acquaintance of the deceased
informed him that Francis was an alcoholic drinker. According to Dr. Baird, his diagnosis of edema of the brain
was based solely on the statement made to him that Francis
used intoxicants. Edema of the brain, said Dr. Baird, results either from alcohol or injury "and in this case there was
no evidence of injury.'' His examination was made by
''gross'' methods, that is, what he could see with his eyes
and feel with his hands, in contradistinction to microscopic
study.
An electrocardiographic tracing made for Francis about
two years before his death showed that he then had a normal
heart for a man of his age. Underwriters' medical expert was
of the opinion that Francis had suffered a ''first degree heart
block.''
Flossie Prancis, the divorced wife of the insured, remained
on friendly terms with him until his death. She testified
that he was a heavy drinker and an habitual user of sleeping
pills. According to her testimony, he did not look well during
the last months before his death and complained of pain,
especially in his shoulder. Other witnesses described Francis
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as ''a heavy but sociable drinker,'' and were o£ the opinion
that he did not appear to be well. However, several friends
o£ the deceased told the jury he was in the best o£ health and
. rarely drank, never to excess.
The medical expert £or the beneficiaries, in response to a
hypothetical question, testified that the cause o£ death was
bronchial pneumonia, and that there ''is nothing in the history
o£ this case or in the autopsy findings which show that alcohol
was a causative factor in any way whatsoever.'' A physician
called by the insurer also was asked a hypothetical question.
He said that an accurate diagnosis could not be made without
microscopic studies. In his opinion, Francis did not die o£
bronchopneumonia. ''I don't believe this man died o£
pneumonia, because i£ you have ever seen a patient die o£
pneumonia you have seen a patient who gasps £or breath . . .
it would be very-very unique £or a man to be lying [supine]
. . . in a car with his tie in place, with the upper button o£
his shirt unopened, lying calmly with the windows shoved
up. I think most people with pneumonia cry £or air, they
want the window open, they want the tie off, they want no
hindrance to respiration.'' He gave as his opinion that the
primary cause o£ death was a "condition which led to circulatory collapse and edema and congestion o£ the lung." As
his reasons £or that opinion he stated, ''Primarily it occurs,
o£ course, in acute heart failure ... [it] is the classical finding o£ all these many people who die £rom an overdose o£
sleeping pills. Many chemical substances, among which is
alcohol . . . I could run through a list o£ many poisons which
can do it.''
Except for the amounts of the insurance, the policies are
identical in form. In part, they provide as follows :
''A. INSURING CLAUSE: If at any time during the currency
of this certificate the Assured shall sustain any accidental
bodily injury . . . caused by . . . Accident, as hereinafter
defined which shall, solely and independently of any other
cause within six ( 6) calendar months from the date of the
accident causing such bodily injury, occasion the disablement
of the Assured ... the Underwriters will pay to the Assured, his Executors, Administrators, or Assigns (or in case
such bodily injury shall occasion the death of the Assured,
to the Beneficiary or Beneficiaries named herein) . . . :
"E. DEFINITIONS: It is understood and agreed that:
"2. 'BoDILY INJURY \VmcH SHALL OccASION DEATH' includes, in addition to the coverage herein provided, death by
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exposure to the elements or physical exhaustion or drowning
resulting from an accident or mechanical or other failure of
anything used as a means of conveyance or transportation.
''G. CONDITIONS:
'' 1. ExcLUSIONS : This certificate does not cover death,
injury or dismemberment:
'' (b) Directly or indirectly caused or contributed to by
intentional self injury disease or natural causes, suicide or
attempted suicide . . .
"2. NoTICE oF Loss: Notice in writing must be sent to
the Underwriters of any accident to the Assured as soon as
reasonably practicable after the occurrence of the accident
: . . In the event of death, immediate notice must be sent to
the Underwriters. In no case will the Underwriters be liable
to make compensation to the assured or to his representatives
unless the medical or other officer of the Underwriters . . .
shall be allowed . . . in the event of death to make any postmortem examination of the body of the Assured as the Underwriters are advised necessary for the purpose of ascertaining
the . . . true cause of death. . . . ''
The beneficiaries attack the judgment against them upon
the ground that the trial judge rlid not properly instruct the
jury. The insurer's position is that the rulings upon instructions were correct.
Complaint is made of an instruction given at the request
of the insurer by which the jury was told that the plaintiffs
had the burden of proving that the death of Francis was
not ''directly or indirectly caused or contributed to by . . .
disease or natural causes.' ' 1 The effect of this instruction,
they assert, is to deprive them of the benefit of the rule
established by Brooks v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 27 Cal.
2d 305 [163 P.2d 689], and particularly as that rule was
applied in Happoldt v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 90 Cal.App.2d
386 [203 P.2d 55].
The Brooks case was an action upon a policy insuring
against "the results of bodily injuries . . . caused directly
1
' ' Plaintiffs have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that the death of George H. Francis was not directly or indirectly caused or contributed to by intentional self-injury, disease or
natural causes. Furthermore plaintiffs may not recover if the evidence
affirmatively shows that intentional self-injury, disease or natural causes
caused or contributed to the death of the insured directly or indirectly.
In determining what is meant by the language 'caused or contributed to'
and 'directly or indirectly' you will consider all of the instructions and
as a whole.''
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and independently of all other causes by violent and accidental means.'' The insurer agreed to pay double indemnity
if the injuries were received ''in consequence of the burning
of any building in which the insured shall be at the commencement of the fire.'' The policy further provided: ''This
insurance shall not cover suicide or any attempt thereat while
sane or insane; . . . nor shall it cover accident, injury, disability, death or any other loss caused wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, by disease or mental infirmity or medical
or surgical treatment therefor.'' The insured, who was chronically ill, died in a fire which started in his bedroom. It
was the autopsy surgeon's opinion that death was caused by
second and third degree burns. After a verdict in favor.
of the insurer, a motion for a new trial was granted upon
the ground of insufficiency of the evidence. In affirming the
order granting a new trial, the court said "that the presence
of preexisting disease or infirmity will not relieve the insurer
from liability if the accident is the proximate cause of death;
and that recovery may be had even though a diseased or
infirm condition appears to actually contribute to cause the
death if the accident sets in progress the chain of events
leading directly to death, or if it is the prime or moving
cause.'' (Pp. 309-310.) Otherwise stated, the insurer is
liable although death is caused partly by a preexisting disease
or infirmity and partly by an accident, if the accident is
the prime or moving cause. (Happoldt v. Guardian Life
Ins. Co., supra, at p. 399.)
The provisions of the policies here sued upon are substantially the same as those considered in the Brooks case. The
appellants assert that the language ''directly or indirectly
caused or contributed to" is too broad and improperly states
the rule as to proximate cause. That phraseology, Underwriters rf)ply, should not be construed in isolation. The defect,
if any, says the insurer, is cured by the concluding sentence
directing the jurors to consider the instructions as a whole.
[1] The first two sentences of the instruction unduly stress
the significance of any contribution to the death of Francis
by preexisting disease or intentional self-injury. To that
extent the instruction is inconsistent with the rule on causation as laid down in the Brooks case, and as stated to the
jurors in several other instructions.
In the last sentence of the instruction, the jurors were
told that they were to determine the meaning of ''caused
or contributed to" and "directly or indirectly" from "all of
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the instructions and as a whole.'' In other instru.ctions, they
were told explicitly that "recovery may be had even though
a diseased or infirm condition appears to actually contribute
to the cause of death, if the happening, within the coverage
of the insurance, sets in progress the chain of events leading
directly to death, or if it is the prime or moving cause.' ' 2
By these instructions, which exactly declared the rule of
the Brooks case, the jurors were informed of the technical
legal meaning of the words used in the policy which state
the conditions of the insurer's liability. It must be assumed
that the jurors followed the court's direction and applied the
law properly.
2
' ' If, under the insurance eertificates here involved, the assured sustained any accidental bodily injury caused by an accident or suffered exuosure or physical exhaustion covered by the certificates as heretofore
defined which bodily injury or exposure or physical exhaustion proximately caused to be set in progress disease, infection or other conditions
which in natural and continuous sequence operated directly to cause death
of the assured, then that death is considered in law to have resulted from
said bodily injury as the bodily injury in such a situation is considered to
be the proximate cause of the death. Bodily injury, you will recall,
includes, under the definition of the certificates, the exposure or physical
exhaustion covered by the certificates." (Plaintiffs' instruction No. 36.)
''The presence of pre-existing disease does not relieve the insurer from
liability if an accident exposure or exhaustion as heretofore defined is
the proximate, prime or moving cause of the insured's death, or if it
sets in progress a chain of events leading directly to the death . . . . ''
(Defendant's instruction No. 20.)
"You are instructed that, if a happening occurs which is within the
coverage provisions of a policy such as those here involved and if that
happening proximately caused a diseased condition or infirmity which
results in death of the insured, then such happening may be the proximate cause of said death." (Plaintiffs' instruction No. 35.)
''If you find that a happening occurred which is within the coverage
of the policy and that it, operating upon an unhealthy body, caused and
put in motion a chain of events which is traced to said happening, then
the happening may be the proximate cause of death. In other words, a
recovery may be had even though a diseased or infirm condition appears
to actually contribute to the cause of death, if the happening, within the
coverage of the insurance, sets in progress the chain of events leading
directly to death, or if it is the prime or moving cause.'' (Plaintiffs'
instruction No. 14.)
"If you find that George I-T. Francis sustained any accidental bodily
injury caused by an accident or if you find that he suffered exposure to
the elements resulting from an accident or exposure to the elements
resulting from mechanical or other failnre of anything used as a means
of conYeyance or transportation or if you find that he suffered physical
exhaustion resulting from an accident or mechanical or other failure of
anything used as a moans of conYeyance or transportation, and if you
further find that such bodily injury or such exposure to the elements or
such physical exhaustion proximately caused some bodily infirmity or
inflammatory process or infection or ailment from which de:1th resulted,
then you are instructed that sueh denth did not result directly or indirectly from disease or natural cause." (Plaintiffs' instruction No. 15.)
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In this connection it is important to note that the evidence presented by Underwriters was not offered in support of the theory that the death of Francis was occasioned
in part by accident and in part by a preexisting disease or
intentional self-injury. The insurer argued to the jury that
death was due to ''an overindulgence in alcohol, combined
with a small ingestion or taking of barbiturates, added on
to a preexisting heart condition.'' On the other hand, the
beneficiaries relied upon bronchopneumonia as being the sole
cause of death. In these circumstances it cannot reasonably
be concluded that the jury could have misinterpreted the
language of the instruction here attacked.
[2] The second instruction complained of also was given
at the insurer's request. It reads: "The burden of proof is
upon plaintiffs to prove by a preponderance of .the evidence
that the death of Mr. Francis was occasioned by accidental
bodily injury caused by accident or by exposure to the elements or physical exhaustion resulting from an accident or
mechanical or other failure of anything used as a means of
conveyance or transportation, and that such was the cause
of his death solely and independently of any other cause.''
Exception is taken to ''solely and independently of any other
cause.'' The quoted language is said to be similar to and
to have the same effect as that in the instruction condemned
in Happoldt v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., supra, at pp. 398-399.
However, the beneficiaries are in no position to criticize the
instruction presented by Underwriters because the jury was
given a substantially similar instruction requested by them. 3
It is well established that a party cannot complain of
an error in an instruction given at the request of his adversary when one requested by him also contains the same
error. (Wells v. Lloyd, 21 Cal.2d 452, 460 [132 P.2d 471] ;
Yolo Water &; Power Co. v. Hudson, 182 Cal. 48, 51 [186
P. 772] .)
[3a] Another instruction, given at the request of Underwriters, reads: ''I have instructed you that the proximate
cause of death is that cause which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the death, and without which· the result would not have
occurred. If, therefore, you find that the death of Mr. Francis
3
' ' You are instructed that, while it is plaintiffs' burden of proof to
show that, solely and independently of any other cause, there was occasioned to the Assured accidental death caused by accident . . . . ''
(Plaintiffs' instruction No. 38.)
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would have occurred in any event at or about the time it
did occur, as a result of intentional self-injury, disease or
natural causes from which he was suffering continuously before and after the alleged accident, then and in those events
your verdict must be in favor of the defendant.''
The beneficiaries argue that this instruction is practically
the same as one in the Happoldt case which was held to be
erroneous. There, however, the instruction was one of three
which were condemned as a group in that they were more
favorable to the insurer than they should have been. The
court concluded that the erroneous group of instructions
''directed the jury to the effect that there could be no recovery
if the death was caused partly by disease and partly by accidental injury." (P. 399.) Here, read with the other instructions, the challenged one is a proper statement of the
principle enunciated in the Brooks case. It merely conversely
declares the rule which requires the beneficiaries to prove
that an accident was the prime or moving cause of death.
If in a given case death would have occurred in any event
from some other cause at or about the time it did occur,
clearly that accident was not the prime or moving cause of
death.
Complaint is also made of the refusal to give one of the
beneficiaries' requested instructions. 4 However, it merely
restated the rule of the Brooks case in slightly different
language. [4] Instructions which are cumulative or merely
amplifications of other instructions, need not be given. (Hicks
v. Ocean Shore Railroad, Inc., 18 Cal.2d 773, 783 [117 P.2d
850] ; Estate of Clark, 180 Cal. 395, 399 [181 P. 639] .)
On the question of burden of proof, the beneficiaries maintain that the insurer was required to prove that death resulted
from intentional self-injury or disease, inasmuch as they are
causes of death excluded by the policies. 5 The position of
4
" Death of George H. Francis did not result directly or indirectly from
disease or natural cause, so as to bar recovery under either policy, if
his death was the proximate result of any one or combination of the
events, covered by said policies and herein summarized, which event or
combination aggravated or awakened a previously existing bodily infirmity or dormant ailment from which death resulted.'' (Plaintiffs'
requested instruction No. 13.)
"Plaintiffs' requested instructions on this point are as follows: "Each
policy contains what are commonly referred to as exclusionary clauses
or exclusions from coverage. Only certain of these are relied upon by
defendant as excluding coverage otherwise provided for by said policies.
'L'hose so relied upon will be noted in these instructions. One of the
exclusions provided for in said policies is: 'Death directly or indirectly

472

ZucKERMAN v. UNDERWRI'rERS AT LLOYD's

[42 C.2d

the insurer was stated to the jury by its instructions placing
the burden upon the beneficiaries to establish (1) that death
resulted from an accidental bodily injury as defined by the
policies, and caused by accident; and (2) that death was not
caused" by intentional self-injury, disease or natural causes. " 6
The burden of proof was upon the beneficiaries, they concede, to establish that the death of Francis occurred as a
result of a "bodily injury" within the meaning of that term
as defined by the policy. (Postler v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 173
Cal. 1, 3 [158 P. 1022] ; Kellner v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 180
Cal. 326, 330 [181 P. 61]; Ogilvie v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,
189 Cal. 406, 413 [209 P. 26, 26 A.L.R. 116] ; Travelers' Ins.
Co. v. Wilkes, 76 F.2d 701, 705.) [5] Ordinarily the burden is upon the insurer to prove a true excepted cause or
excluded risk in order to defeat liability upon that ground.
(Mattson v. Maryland Casualty Co., 100 Cal.App. 96, 98
[279 P. 1045]; Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Wilkes, supra, p. 705.)
The question for decision, therefore, is whether, under the
caused or contributed to by disease or natural causes.' As to chis exclusion, you are instructed as follows:" (Plaintiffs' requested, instruction No. 12.) "Death of George H. Francis did not result directly or
indirectly from disease or natural cause, so as to bar recovery under
either policy, if his death was the proximate result of any one or combination of the events, covered by said policies and herein summarized,
which event or combination aggravated or awakened a previously existing
bodily infirmity or dormant ailment from which death resulted.''
(Plaintiffs' requested instruction No. 13.) "Another exclusion provided
for in said policies is: 'Death directly or indirectly caused or contributed to by intentional self-injury.' As to this exclusionary provision
you are instructed as follows:" (Plaintiffs' conditionally requested instruction No. 16.) "In order to sustain this defense, the burden rests
upon defendant Underwriters to prove by a preponderance of the evidence, each required element thereof. Under this exclusionary provision,
it is not sufficient to prove merely that there was a self-injury, if any.
The proof must further establish by a preponderance that the selfinjury, if any, was intentional on the part of the insured and also that
it either directly or indirectly caused or contributed to the death of the
insured. If the evidence fails to establish each of these required elements by a preponderance, then this exclusionary provision has not been
proven but must be determined against defendant and in favor of
plaintiffs." (Plaintiffs' conditionally requested instruction No. 17.)
6
In its entirety, as modified by the trial court, the second instruction
states: "Plaintiffs have the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that the death of George H. Francis was not directly or
indirectly caused or contributed to by intentional self-injury, disease
or natural causes. Furthermore plaintiffs may not reeover if the evidence affirmatively shows that intentional self-injury, disease or natural
causes caused or contributed to the death of the insured directly or indirectly. In determining what is meant by the language 'caused or
contributed to' and 'directly or indirectly' you will consider all of the
instructions and as a whole. ''
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present policies, death occasioned by either intentional selfinjury or disease, is death by reason of an excepted cause.
The policies here insured against ''accidental bodily injury
[including 'bodily injury which shall occasion death' as defined in the policies] caused by accident.'' ''Accident'' has
been defined as ''a casualty-something out of the usual
course of events and which happens suddenly and unexpectedly and without any design of the person injured.''
(Rock v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 172 Cal. 462, 465 [156 P. 1029,
L.R.A. 1916E 1196] ; Richards v. Travelers Ins. Co., 89 Cal.
170, 175 [26 P. 762, 23 Am.St.Rep. 455] .) Basically, these
policies are contracts insuring against accident, and it need
not be here determined whether they can be characterized
as insuring against "accidental death" or only against "death
effected by accidental means." (Roclc v. Travelers' Ins. Co.,
supra, p. 465; and see Unt:ted States Mut. Ace. Assn. v.
Barry, 131 U.S. 100, 121 [9 S.Ct. 755, 33 L.Ed. 60] ; Lincoln
Nat. L'ife Ins. Co. v. Erickson [O.C.A. 8th], 42 F.2d 997, 1000.)
The beneficiaries contend that Clause E-2 of the policy
enlarged the coverage as stated in other provisions of the
contract. However, unquestionably the only purpose of that
clause is to define the term ''any accidental bodily injury
caused by accident'' to include ''death by exposure to the
elements or physical exhaustion . . . resulting from an accident or other failure or anything used as a means of conveyance or transportation." And the law governing the insurer's
liability was correctly stated to the jury.
[6] With regard to "intentional self-injury," the jury
was properly instructed as to burden of proof. It is the
antonym of ''accidental,'' and therefore expresses a concept
which manifestly is the antithesis of a death occasioned by
accident. [7] Death by suicide reasonably may be said
to have been caused by "intentional self-injury" (Barber v.
Industrial Corn., 241 Wis. 462, 464-465 [6 N.W.2d 199, 143
A.L.R. 1222]), and in an action upon an accident policy
which excluded liability for death by suicide, the court pointed
out that the contract did not provide for payment for death
but for death by accident. ''Suicide, at least when sane, is
not accidental death. A plaintiff under this policy has the
burden of proving an accidental death, thereby negativing
suicide." (Travelers' lns. Oo. v. W'ilkes, supra, p. 705; see
also New York L'ife Ins. Co. v. Garner, 303 U.S. 161, 171
[58 S.Ct. 500, 82 L.Ed. 726, 114 A.L.R. 1218]; Griffin v.
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Prudential Ins. Co., 102 Utah 563, 586 [133 P.2d 333, 114
A.L.R. 1402] .) [8] By analogy, then, in a suit upon an
accident policy, the beneficiary's proof of accident proximately
causing death necessarily negatives "intentional self-injury."
[9] Upon that construction of the insuring provisions,
Dennis v. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co., 84 Cal. 570 [24 P. 120],
and Bebbington v. California Western States Life Ins. Co., 30
Cal.2d 157 [180 P.2d 673, 1 A.L.R.2d 361], are distinguishable. The Dennis case was an action to recover upon the
usual life insurance policy containing an exception to liability if death resulted from suicide. Reasoning that the
exception was a true condition subsequent, the court placed
upon the insurer the burden of proving suicide as the proximate cause of death. Mrs. Bebbington sued upon a life insurance policy with a clause excluding liability in the event
the death of the insured occurred as a result of airplane
travel other than as a fare-paying passenger in a licensed
aircraft flying a regularly scheduled passenger flight. Under
such circumstances, the liability of the insurer was limited
to the reserve of the policy. Neither of those decisions states
the proper rule applicable to an accident insurance policy.
Other cases relied upon by the beneficiaries are also distinguishable. Postler v. Travele1·s' Ins. Co., supra, was an
action upon policies insuring ''against bodily injuries effected
directly and independently of all other causes through external, violent, and accidental means (suicide, whether sane
or insane, is not covered)." It was held, without discussion,
and citing Dennis v. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra, that
'' [ o] n the issue of suicide the burden of proof rested upon
the defendant.'' However, the court failed to note that the
Dennis case was an action upon a life insurance policy, and
the rule of law there stated and followed is inapplicable to
accident insurance. The burden of establishing suicide, therefore, should not have been put upon the insurer, as the provision as to death from that cause was not a condition subsequent, but merely definitive of the precise risk assumed.
Mah See v. North American Ace. Ins. Co., 190 Cal. 421
[213 P. 42, 26 A.L.R. 123], also was an action upon a life
insurance policy and did not distinguish correctly between
different forms of insurance. Insofar as these decisions are
inconsistent with the rule here stated upon the issue of burden
of proof, they are overruled. For the same reason, and to
the same extent, Hmtsh v. Pacific States Life Ins. Co., 2 Cal.
App.2d 14 [37 P.2d 741], is disapproved.
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(10] A rule as to whether or not death caused by disease
constitutes a true excepted risk cannot be given in general
terms or by way or broad principles of law. As a general proposition, however, "The insurer, under an accident
policy, is not liable for death by mere disease, even in the
absence of the usual clause expressly excluding disease from
among the risks assumed.'' (Vance on Insurance [2d ed.
1930], § 259, p. 880.) The rule is clear but varying definitions
of "disease" make it difficult to apply.
A medical definition of ''disease'' is : ''In general, any
departure from a state of health ; an illness or a disease.
More specifically a definite morbid process having a characteristic tr.ain of symptoms. It may affect the whole body
or any of its parts, and its etiology, pathology, and prognosis
may be known or unknown.'' (The American Illustrated
Medical Dictionary [Dorland], 17th ed. 1937.) In Dickerson
v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., 56 Ariz. 70 [105 P.2d 517],
the court relied principally upon the statement in Webster's
Dictionary. In the course of considering an accident policy
containing provisions similar to the present ones, "disease"
was defined as a condition in which bodily health is seriously
attacked, deranged, or impaired, and as an alteration of state
of the human body or some of its organs or parts, interrupting
or disturbing the performance of the vital functions.
In Matter of Connelly v. Hunt Furniture Co., 240 N.Y. 83
[147 N.E. 366], Judge Cardozo succinctly pointed out the
elusive character of ''disease'' as it relates to workmen's
compensation statutes. He said: "We attempt no scientifically exact discrimination between accident and disease or
between disease and injury. None perhaps is possible, for
the two concepts are not always exclusive, the one of the
other, but often overlap." ( P. 84.)
[11] Here, the sole theory of the beneficiaries is that there
is liability under the language of Clause E-2 of the policies.
The insurer has not urged that the beneficiaries' theory,
assuming it to be factually true, was not within the scope
and intent of the clause. Nor do the beneficiaries assert that
the evidence offered by Underwriters which tended to show
that Francis was suffering from certain organic conditions,
did not constitute "disease." In these circumstances, the
jury having been instructed upon burden of proof in very
general terms only, without attempting to define disease, there
was no error.
For these reasons, under the policies here sued upon,
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death occasioned by intentional self-injury or disease is not
one which occurs by reason of excepted causes. The "excluelause'' is the antithesis of the ''insuring clause.''
If ]'rands died as the result of an accident, death was not
occasioned by intentional self-injury, disease or natural
causes. Conversely, if intentional self-injury, disease or
natural causes caused his death, it did not result from an
accident within the meaning of the policy. The instructions
to the jury in regard to the burden of proof on these issues
were correct.
It is not significant that Underwriters pleaded as affirmative defenses that the death of Francis occurred as a result
of either intentional self-injury or disease and natural causes.
[12] A denial that death was occasioned by a bodily injury
within the meaning of the policy is a sufficient plea. An
additional defense that it was the result of intentional selfinjury or disease does not shift the burden of proof to the
defendant. (Kellner v. Travelers' Ins. Co., supra, p. 330;
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gamer, supra, p. 171; Travelers'
Ins. Co. v. Wilkes, supra, p. 705; Whitlatch v. Fidelity &
Casualty Co., 149 N.Y. 45, 48 [43 N.E. 405].)
[3b] The beneficiaries challenge an instruction which
reads, in part: ''If, therefore, you find that the death of
Mr. Francis would have occurred in any event at or about
the time it did occur, as a result of intentional self-injury,
disease or natural causes from which he was suffering continuously before and after the alleged accident, then and
in those events your verdict must be in favor of the defendant.'' It is urged that this instruction, requested by
Underwriters, erroneously assumed as an established fact
that Francis continuously before and after the accident was
suffering from some self-injury, disease or natural condition,
whereas the evidence thereon was either otherwise or directly
conflicting. The criticism ignores the prefatory language,
''If, therefore, you find,'' and the concluding qualification,
"then and in those events." (See Happoldt v. Gttardian Life
Ins. Co., sttpra, pp. 397-398.)
[13] Complaint is made of the court's refusal to instruct
upon the difference between ''accidental death'' and ''death
by accidental means." It is argued that the policies covered
''accidental death,'' which is a less limited concept, and thus
afforded greater coverage than ''death by accidental means.''
In a proper case that distinction should be made. (Ogilvie
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., supra, p. 411; Rock v. Travelers' Ins.
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Go., sttpra, p. 465; 111uh&al Ace. Assn. v. Barry, supra, p. 121;
Lincoln Nat. L1:[e Ins. Go. v. Erickson, sttpra, p. 1000.) Here,
however, the policies do not use either term, and their provisions, including Clause E-2 were before the jury. Nothing
more was required.
[14] The beneficiaries also insist that the jury should
have been instructed as to the meaning of "bodily injury."
It is their position that to leave the term undefined allows
the jury to surmise or speculate or determine that it could
not include a death where no external injury was had. However, "bodily injury" was defined for the jurors by stating
the express language of the policies, and they were told:
'' 'Bodily injury which shall occasion death' includes, in
addition to the coverage herein provided, death by exposure
to the elements or physical exhaustion or drowning resulting
from an accident or mechanical or other failure of anything
used as a means of conveyance or transportation." No
prejudice resulted from the refusal to instruct as to other
meanings of the insuring phrase.
The instruction to the effect that immediate notice of death
was required to be given Underwriters is also attacked by
the beneficiaries. They claim that there has not been full
compliance with section 551 of the Insurance Code. That
statute provides: "Except in the case of life, marine, or
fire insurance, notice of an accident, injury or death may
be given at any time within twenty days after the event,
to the insurer under a policy against loss therefrom. In
such a policy, no requirement of notice within a lesser period
shall be valid." It is asserted that this is not a case involving
"life, marine or fire insurance," and inasmuch as it has been
stipulated that notice was given within the 20-day limit,
Underwriters cannot rely upon the provision of the policies.
In the alternative, the beneficiaries take the position that
section 10335 of the Insurance Code governs the time of notice
of claim. That section permits the inclusion of "immediate
notice in case of accidental death'' only in the event the
statutory ''standard provision relative to time of notice of
claim" also is used. The beneficiaries assert that even if
it is assumed that the language in the policy need not be
identical with that of the statute, the policies on the life of
Francis do not substantially comply with the legislative requirement. They invoke the rule that whel'e a prescribed
statutory provision is not contained in the policy, the insurer
will be bound either by the statutory provision or by the
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policy provision, whichever is more favorable to the beneficiary. It is contended, also, that Underwriters has waived
notice of claim in that objection was not made promptly and
specifically upon that ground, as required by section 554
of the Insurance Code. Furthermore, it is argued, in the
event that the question of notice properly was left to the
jury's determination, the instructions did not adequately
state as to when notice has been given "immediately."
As for the last point, the jury was told: ''A provision that
immediate notice be given is satisfied by notice which is
prompt and reasonable under the particular circumstances.
A failure to give immediate notice is no defense where it
was not reasonably possible to give such notice and the notice
actually was given as soon as reasonably possible.'' And
again, ''Thus the plaintiffs have the burden of proving that
notice was given to the Underwriters within a reasonable
time according to the circumstances existing in this case.''
It is not necessary to pass upon the other contentions
pertaining to. notice. [15a] Even if it be assumed that the
issue of notice should not have been left to the jury's determination, there has not been a miscarriage of justice within
the meaning of the constitutional provision. (Cal. Const.,
art. VI, § 4%.)
On this issue the beneficiaries were treated separately. The
jury was instructed: "Plaintiffs Zuckerman and Edmunds
as members of the partnership are presumed to have had
knowledge of the terms and conditions of the certificates at
all times after the certificates were issued and at the time of
the death of deceased. They were required to notify defendant
immediately as soon as they learned of the death. It is for
you to determine when they or either of them or anyone
acting in their behalf and with their knowledge learned of
the death, and it is for you to determine further whether
they notified defendant immediately of the death. As to the
plaintiff James Francis it is for you to determine (1) when
he learned of the existence of the certificate naming him as
beneficiary in the event of the death of his brother and its
requirement of immediate notice to defendant, (2) when he
learned of the death and (3) whether, as soon as he had
knowledge of the requirement of immediate notice and also
had knowledge of the death of deceased he gave such immediate notice to .defendant by such means and in such a manner
as was reasonable and proper under all the circumstances.''
[16] It must be assumed that the jury understood the
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instructions and correctly applied them to the evidence.
(Nunneley v. Edgar Hotel, 36 Cal.2d 493, 500 [225 P.2d
497] ; Henderson v. Los Angeles Traction Co., 150 Cal. 689,
697 [89 P. 976] .) [15b] James did not know that he was
a named beneficiary in one of the policies until approximately
the time when notice was given, March 29th. The notice
dated March 29th was given on behalf of the law partnership
and James. Under those circumstances, there can be little
doubt that the jury found that James gave "immediate notice." The jury, however, found against him as well as
against the law partnership. James, therefore, could not
have been prejudiced by permitting the issue of notice to go
to the jury.
Nor can it be argued that the law partnership, nevertheless, was prejudiced in that regard. On only one other
issue, the question pertaining to Underwriters' right to
autopsy, were the plaintiffs treated separately. Unless the
jury reasonably might have found that James did not discharge his duties as to that condition, then neither he· nor
the partnership could possibly have been prejudiced by the
submission of the issue of notice to the jury. Unless the
jury decided against James on either the issue of notice or
that of autopsy rights, the case necessarily must have
been decided upon another ground. The remaining ground
concerns the cause of death as defined by the policies. That
is one which is common to the claims of all of the beneficiaries.
The beneficiaries also contend that the issue of autopsy
rights should not have been submitted to the jury for determination. That position is based upon their interpretation
of that part of Clause G-2 of the policies which provides:
''In no case will the Underwriters be liable to make compensation to the Assured or to his represr.ntatives . . . unless
. . . Underwriters . . . shall be allowed . . . in the event of
death to make any post-mortem examination of the body of
the Assured as [is] necessary . . . . "
It is argued that
''beneficiaries'' are not ''representatives'' of the assured;
also, that the language of an insurance policy is to be construed most strongly against the insurer, particularly where
a forfeiture provision is involved. Another point is that Underwriters waived the right to autopsy in that it did not make
a prompt request. It is quite improbable that the jury found
against James Francis on the ground of noncompliance witlt
the autopsy provision. One instruction read: "Plaintiff
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,James Francis as a brother of deceased could have consented
to such a post mortem by defendant. Neither James Francis
nor the other beneficiaries in this case, however, could by
his own order have prevented the cremation of the body of
deceased if such cremation had been ordered by some person
legally authorized so to do. \Vhen a beneficiary knew of the
terms of the certificates and learned of the death of deceased
it was his duty to do such things as were reasonable and
proper under all the circumstances to afford defendant the
opportunity to make its own post mortem examination.''
[17] The uncontradicted testimony of James Francis conclusively proves, for the purpose of determining whether or
not asserted error was prejudicial, that he did not order
cremation of the body. He did not know that he was a
beneficiary under one of the policies until at least one week
after the cremation. Under these circumstances, he was
not prejudiced by the submission of that issue to the jury.
Also, as the jury most probably did not find against
JamBs Francis on the issue of notice, the implied finding of
the jury is that the death of the insured did not result from
a "bodily injury" within the meaning of the policies. That
implied finding effectively prevents the law partners of
Francis from claiming prejudicial error as to them in permitting the questions of notice and autopsy rights to go to
the jury.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J.,
concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
I agree with the beneficiaries that Brooks v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 27 Cal.2d 305 [163 P.2d 689], decided by a
unanimous court, is controlling here. The attempt on the
part of the majority of this court to distinguish it without
overruling it, in my opinion, but serves to point out the
correctness of that decision as applied to the facts presented
here. We said there that " [on] the other hand there !s
authority for what in our opinion is the correct rule, that
the presence of preexisting disease or infirmity will not relieve the insurer from liability if the accident is the proximate
cause of death; and that recovery may be had even though
a diseased or infirm condition appears to actually contribute
to cause the death if the accident sets in progress the chain
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of events leading directly to death, or if it is the prime or
moving cause.
(Scanlan v.
Ins. Co.,
(C.C.A. 7th, 1937), 93 F.2d
v. Pntdential
Ins. Co. of Ame1·ica (1939), 834
[6 A.2d 55, 59];
1 Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice (1941), pp. 497, 498;
6 Couch on Insurance (1930), § 1249, p. 4569 cf. Hanna v.
Interstate B. JJI. Ace. Assn., 41 Cal.App. 308, 310 [182 P.
771] .) " It was also said there that "[a]lthough it appears
that the insured was suffering from an incurable cancer and
was under the influence of narcotics given to relieve pain, and
that by reason of his weakened and infirm condition he may
have been less able than a normal person to withstand the
effect of the injuries, there is evidence from which the court
could conclude that the proximate cause of his death was
burns received in a fire of accidental origin.''
An analysis of the facts involved here in the light of the
rule of the Brooks case shows that the policy provided, under
the heading ''DEFINITIONS,'' that it was understood and
agreed that "bodily injury which shall occasion death" included, "in addition to the coverage herein provided, death
by exposure to the elements or physical exhaustion or drowning resulting from an accident or mechanical or other failure
of anything used as a means of conveyance or transportation.''
(Emphasis added.) Here, the insured suffered from exposure
to the elements by reason of the failure of his boat to return
to the mainland. The following statement from the majority
opinion relative to the medical testimony in this case shows
that it was based on the worst kind of hearsay evidence :
"Dr. Baird testified that he put 'acute alcoholism' on the
death certificate because au acquaintance of the deceased informed him that Francis was an alcoholic drinker. According to Dr. Baird, his diagnosis of edema of the brain was
based solely on the statement made to him that Francis used
intoxicants. Edema of the brain, said Dr. Baird, results
either from alcohol or injury 'and in this case there was no
evidence of injur·y.' His examination was made by 'gross'
methods, that is, what he could see with his eyes and feel
with his hands, in contradistinction to microscopic study.''
It should be noted that under the provisions of the policy
there needed to be no evidence of injury as such. There
would be no evidence of injury so far as physical exhaustion
was concerned, or in all probability so far as exposure to
the elements was concerned. The beneficiaries established the
42 C.2d-16
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facts concerning the ill-fated fishing trip. In all other respects the evidence was highly conflicting. Some witnesses
testified that the insured was a heavy drinker; others that
he never drank to excess; still others testified that he rarely
drank. The evidence was also in direct conflict as to whether
the insured had been ill prior to the fishing trip. The medical
testimony was uncertain and conflicting and was, for the
most part, based upon insufficient evidence and hearsay. An
example is the medical evidence relating to the cause of death:
the expert for the beneficiaries testified that the insured died
of bronchial pneumonia; the expert for the insurer testified
that he ''didn't believe'' the insured died of pneumonia, and
that it was his opinion that the primary cause of death was
a ''condition which led to circulatory collapse and edema
and congestion of the lung" which occurred "primarily" in
acute heart failure. Other evidence showed that an electrocardiagram made for the insured two years before his death
established that Francis had a normal heart for a man of
his age.
The evidence showed that the insured, after suffering the
mishap, had chills, complained of not feeling well to the
extent of contacting his doctor, taking the prescribed drugs,
and making plans to go to the desert to recuperate. There
is nothing to show that any previous physical condition
substantially or materially contributed to the death of the
insured. The majority admits that the policy sued on here
is substantially the same as in the Brooks case and that
the insurer may be held liable although death is caused partly
by a preexisting disease or infirmity and partly by accident
so long as the accident is the prime or moving cause. In
view of the rule of the Brooks case and the facts presented
here, one of the instructions complained of was a misstatement
of the law and highly prejudicial to the beneficiaries. That
instruction told the jury, "Furthermore plaintiffs may not
recover if the evidence affirmatively shows that intentional
self-injury, disease or natural causes caused or contributed
to the death of the insured directly or indirectly." In the
majority opinion it is said, ''The first two sentences of the
instruction unduly stress the significance of any contribution
to the death of Francis by pre-existing disease or intentional
self-injury. To that extent the instruction is inconsistent
with the rule on causation as laid down in the Brooks case,
and as stated to the jurors in several other instructions.''
(Emphasis added.) As I have heretofore pointed out, the
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Brooks case qualifies the provision by holding that the insurer
is not relieved from liability if a preexisting disease or infirmity ''appears to actually contribute to cause the death if
the accident sets in progress the chain of events leading directly to death, or if it is the prime or moving cause.''
(Emphasis added.) The majority explain away the inconsistencies by the argument that other instructions followed
the rule of the Brooks case. For every instruction stating
the rule of the Brooks case, there is another instruction which
is inconsistent with it. For example, the jury was directed
to deny recovery if the death was caused partially by disease
and partially by accident. Still another instruction informed
the jury that plaintiffs must prove, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the insured met his death by accident or
exposure and that the death occurred "solely and independently" (italics added) of any other cause.
The most flagrantly prejudicial, and erroneous, instruction
was that which placed upon the beneficiaries the burden of
proving that the insured's death was not caused by intentional
self-injury, disease or natural causes. The majority concedes
that ''ordinarily the burden is upon the insurer to prove a
true excepted cause or excluded risk in order to defeat
liability upon that ground.'' In order to avoid the effect of
this concession, it is held that these exceptions were not
exceptions at all. The insurer pleaded, in its answer, as
separate and affirmative defenses, that death was caused by
disease or by natural causes; as an amendment to the answer,
another affirmative defense was added-that death was caused
by intentional self-injury. It had been held prior to the
Brooks case that the absence of disease was a part of the
plaintiff's case; and, prior to the present case, it had also
been held that death by intentional self-injury, or suicide,
was part of the insurer's case and that the burden of proof
was upon the insurer. In order to hold that the burden of
proving that the death was not caused by intentional selfinjury was on the plaintiffs the majority says " [b] y analogy
then, in a suit upon an accident policy, by proof of accident
proximately causing death, the beneficiary necessarily negatives 'intentional self-injury'" and relies upon Barber v.
lnd1£strial Com., 241 Wis. 462, 464-465 [6 N.W.2d 199, 143
A.L.R. 1222], Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Wilkes, 76 F.2d 701,
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gamer, 303 U.S. 161 [58 S.Ct.
500, 82 L.Ed. 726, 114 A.L.R. 1218], Griffin v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 102 Utah 563 [133 P.2d 333, 144 A.L.R. 1402].
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The majority say '' [I] t is not significant that Underwriters
pleaded as affirmative defenses that the death of Francis
occurred as a result of either intentional self-injury or disease
and natural causes. A denial that death was occasioned by
a bodily injury within the meaning· of the policy is a sufficient
plea. An additional defense that it was the result of intentional self-injury or disease does not shift the burden of
proof to the defendant. [Citations.] " All of this rests
upon the reasoning that intentional self-injury is the antonym
of accidental and therefore expresses a concept which manifestly is the antithesis of a death occasioned by accident.
''The rule supported by the overwhelming weight of authority,
in cases involving accident policies or other policies with accident features containing express conditions or exceptions
excluding or limiting the coverage of the policy as to an
injury or death which would otherwise be within such cover·age, is that the burden of proving that the insured's injury
or death was within such conditions or exceptions is on the
insurer, and that the plaintiff is not under any burden of
negativing application of such exception or conditions.''
(Emphasis added; 142 A.L.R. 746.) Where the instructions
erroneously place the burden of proof upon the wrong party,
the error is prejudicial (Anderson v. Mothershead, 19 Cal.
App.2d 97 [64 P.2d 995]; Westberg v. Willde, 14 Cal.2d 360
[94 P.2d 590]; Howard v. Worthington, 50 Cal.App. 556 [195
P. 709] ; FergtlSOn v. Nakahara, 43 Cal.App.2d 435 [110
P.2d 1091] ; Ross v. Baldwin, 44 Cal.App.2d 433 [112 P.2d
666] ; Scott v. Renz, 67 Cal.App.2d 428 [154 P.2d 7381).
Two California cases (Dennis v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
84 Cal. 570 [24 P. 120], and Bebbington v. California Western States Life Ins. Co., 30 Cal.2d 157 [180 P.2d 673, 1
A.J_;.R.2d 361]) are distinguished because they involved life
insurance policies which contained exceptions if death resulted from suicide. Postler v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 173 Cal. 1
[158 P. 1022], relied upon the Dennis case without noting
that the Dennis case involved a life insurance policy; Mah
See v. North American Ace. Ins. Co., 190 Cal. 421 [213 P.
42, 26 A.L.R. 123], was an action upon a life insurance policy
as vvas Hmtsh v. Pacific States L1Je Ins. Co., 2 Cal.App.2d
14 [37 P.2d 741]. As nearly as can be ascertained from the
majority opinion, so far as the burden of proof is concerned,
the following cases are overr1tled: Mah See v. North American Ace. Ins. Co., 190 Cal. 421 [213 P. 42, 26 A.L.R. 123] ;
Denn1:s v. Union Jltlut. Life Ins. Co., 84 Cal. 570 [24 P 120] ;
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Bebbington v Cal'ifornia 1Vestern States Life Ins. Co., 30
Cal.2d 157 [180 P.2d 673, 1 A.L.R.2d 361}; Postler v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 173 Cal. 1
P.
. IImtsh v.
States Life Ins. Co., 2 Cal.App.2d 14
P.2d
, is disapproved. Apparently, the rule is now to be that the burden
of proof is to be on plaintiff to prove that an exception to
the policy did not occur to cause the death in an accident
policy and upon the defendant where a life insurance policy
is concerned. I say, "apparently," because it is not clear
whether the burden is to be the same so far as both types
of policy are concerned.
It is interesting to note that the majority opinion will have
the effect of overruling sub silentio many other California
cases: It is also interesting to note that of the cases relied
upon for the proposition that the burden of proof was not
upon the defendant, only one is a California case (Kellner v.
Travelers' Ins. Co., 180 Cal. 326 [181 P. 61]). The other
cases relied upon for that proposition are New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Garner, 303 U.S. 161 [58 S.Ct. 500, 82 L.Ed. 726,
114 A.L.R. 1218] (a life insurance policy case arising in
Montana and involving the question of accidental, or suicidal,
death); TravelM·s' Ins. Co. v. Wilkes, 76 F.2d 701 (a case
arising in Florida and involving a life insurance policy and
the question of accidental, or suicidal, death); and a New
York case-Whitlatch v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 149 N.Y.
45, 58 [43 N.E. 405]. Other cases relied on are from Utah,
Arizona and Wisconsin.
In view of the medical testimony that there was no evidence
of "injury," I agree with the beneficiaries that the meaning
of bodily injury under the policy should have been given to
the jury. It is my opinion that the instructions given were
conflicting and confusing and weighted in favor of the insurer. The evidence was in direct conflict. The insured was
dead; there were no signs of outward "injury." According
to the medical testimony the insurer's medical expert testified
that the insured coU:ld not have died of pneumonia because
the clothing was not disarranged. .As I have pointed out,
physical exhaustion would leave no outward signs, nor, in
all probability, would death from exposure to the elements.
I believe that in a case of this type, the instructions should
be fairly and concisely given ; that when they are as confusing
and conflicting as they are in the case at bar, no good purpose
may be served by endeavoring to reconcile them in order to
reach a result. I feel, too, most strongly that California cases
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should not be overruled and strained constructions placed
upon other cases in order to reach a desired result. As I
stated at the beginning of this dissent, it is impossible to
distinguish the Brooks case from the one at bar, and any
attempt to do so can lead to nothing but confusion.
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied April 7,
1954. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should
be granted.
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MORGAN A. STIVERS et al., Appellants, v. DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT et al., Respondents.
[1] Unemployment Insurance-Excluded Employments-Agricultural Labor.-Services performed by packing-house labor constitutes "agricultural labor" within meaning of Unemployment
Insurance Act (Stats. 1935, p. 1226, as amended; 3 Deering's
Gen. Laws, Act 8780d), excluding such labor from operation
of act, only if services are performed in employ of owner or
tenant of farm on which materials in their raw or natural
state are produced and if such services are carried on as an
incident to ordinary farming operations as distinguished from
commercial operations. (See Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 22, § 43,
amending rule 7.1 of Department of Employment.)
[2a, 2b] Id.-Exclttded Employments-Agricultural Labor.-Partners owning citrus groves and a packing-house which serves
public to extent of 20 per cent of its total fruit-packing operations, the remaining 80 per cent coming from partners' own
groves, cannot avoid commercial aspect of packing-house and
their consequent liability for unemployment contributions on
premise that principal purpose of such house is to facilitate
marketing of crops from their own groves; the test under
Unemployment Insurance Act for determining whether activities of their. employees is agricultural is not principal purpose
of enterprise, but whether services performed by employees
are carried on as an incident to ordinary farming operations.
[3] !d.-Excluded Employments- Mode for Determining.-Provisions in Unemployment Insurance Act (Stats. 1945, pp. 1486,
2230; see Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 22, § 42) for segregation of
[1] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp (1950 Rev.), Unemployment Relief
-Insurance Act, § 16.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-4] Unemployment Insurance, § 15.

